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natural evil: fo that difference affords a reafon to every moral agent, to chuse to tafte pleasure himself, and to chufe to communicate pleasure to others; and it likewise affords a reafon why he should chufe to avoid pain himself, and chufe to avoid communicating pain to others, when these are confidered abstractedly from all other confiderations. And, as there is a reafon founded in nature for the acting right, and a reason against the acting wrong, a reafon for the communicating of pleasure, and a reason against the communicating of pain: fo to act agreeably to reafon in doing the former, is what constitutes moral good; and to act against the reafon of the thing in doing the latter, is what conftitutes moral evil: moral good and evil in every inftance being nothing else, but the acting agreeably with, or contrary to that reafon or rule of action which is founded in, and refults from the natural and effential difference in things: and all moral obligations are nothing else, but the reasons refulting from that difference, why we should chufe to act this way, or that way, rather than their contraries. And, as those reafons for acting one way rather than another, are founded in nature; that is, they refult from the natural and effential difference in things; fo they become a rule of action which is equally obliging to every moral agent; that is, to every agent capable of difcerning that

difference; and confequently (in this fenfe of the word oblige,) God as he is a moral agent, is obliged to govern his actions by this rule. And,

As there is a reafon or rule of action, which is equally obliging to every moral agent: fo from hence it will follow, that the reasonablenefs of an action, ought to determine the will of every rational creature to the performance of that action; even tho', there be no other motive to it; and tho', there be a thousand temptations to excite to the contrary. For, whilft (when all things are taken into the cafe) it is reasonable that an action fhould be performed, it is impoffible that any, even the strongest temptations (how many foever they be,) fhould make it reasonable to omit that action; because if that were the cafe, then, under these circumftances, it would not be a reasonable, or at least an indifferent, but an unreafonable action; and as fuch, it does not come into the prefent queftion; except we can fuppofe an action to be both reafonable and unreasonable or indifferent at the fame time, and under the fame circumftances, which is a manifeft contradiction. So that, to fuppofe fome other motives fhould take place befides the reafonableness of an action, which may be more than a balance to the many and strong temptations with which a reafonable creature may be furrounded, in

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order to engage his will for the choice of that action, and without which motives, the bare reasonableness of an action would not be more than a balance to those temptations, is exceedingly wrong: because the reasonableness of an action, is in itself when confidered abstractedly from all other motives, more than a balance to all tempta tions; for other ways it would not be a reafonable action. And, when an action appears to be reasonable; that, ought in reason to determine the will of every reasonable creature, for the choice of that action, fuppofing no other motive intervened to invite him to it, and fuppofing ten thousand temp tations invited him to the contrary. And, it is his not following his reafon in oppofition to those temptations, which renders him justly condemnable to himself, and to every other reasonable being; and confequently to his maker as fuch. And, here I beg leave to obferve to my reader, that the prefent question is, what ought in reason to determine the will of a being endowed with a reasoning faculty, to the performance of a reasonable action; and not, what is in fact fufficient for this purpose. And here I fay, that the reasonableness of an action, ought in reafon to determine the will of every fuch being, for the choice of that action: but then, it depends upon the pleasure of each individual, whether it fhall

in fact be fufficient for this purpose or not. And, this is the cafe of all other motives which may be fuperadded; it depends upon the pleasure of each individual, whether in fact those motives fhall be to him the ground and reason of action or not. And therefore we fee that, not only the unreasonableness of an action, but all other motives which may be added to it, viz. the hopes and fears of this world, and the hopes and fears of the world to come, are not fufficient in fact to restrain some men from unreasonable actions. And,

As the reasonableness of an action, ought to determine the will of every rational being, for the choice of that action, fuppofing no other motive be fuperadded, and fuppofing many temptations invite to the contrary: fo upon this, the equity and certainty of a future judgment is founded, and not upon any divine revelation concerning it. For, as there is a natural and an effential difference in things, and a rule of action resulting from that difference, which every mo ral agent is in reafon obliged to govern his actions by; and, as there is planted in man, a capacity or power which enables him to difcern that difference, and it is left to his choice, to act either agreeably with, or repugnant to reafon, and thereby to be either a benefactor or a plague to the intelligent world: fo, from hence arifes the equity and

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reasonableness of God's calling fuch creatures to an account (when they have finished their courfe in this world) and rewarding the virtuous, and punishing the vicious parts of our fpecies, according as they have rendered themselves the futable and proper objects of either. I fay, the equity and reafonableness of fuch a procedure, refults from the natural and the effential difference in things, and not from any divine declaration concerning it: because it muft and will be the fame in this respect, whether God had made any declaration that he will judge and deal thus with mankind, or not. And tho', the divine promifes and threatnings, are fecondary and farther motives to a moral agent, to perform a reasonable action; as his future intereft is concerned in the cafe; yet the reafonableness and equity of a future judgment, and of that rule of action by which we fhall be judged, does not refult from nor depend upon thofe promifes and threatnings, but from the natural and effential difference in things; and therefore, are and must be the fame, whether God had given any promises and threatnings or not. The rule of action which moral agents are to govern their behaviour by, is founded in reafon, and as fuch, it ought to be made the measure of our actions, whether God had given any threatnings or promifes conG cerning

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