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some reasons the mind is more inclined or compelled to notice.

2. Natural affociations of ideas refult from the fame property of one or all bodies exciting ideas in the different fenfes, or parts adjacent and connected of the fame body exciting different ideas in the fame fenfe, e. g. The tangible idea of distance is affociated with the vifible and these with the audible idea.

3. Accidental affociations are fuch as have happeħed from accidental circumstances to particular animals.

4. The memory retains in fome degree these perceptions, and recollects the ideas accompanying and immediately fuccecding each other: Two things connected together in our paft experience, will either more or lefs be connected or affociated or fucceffive in the memory, and from the one we may often deduce the other with more or lefs facility, e. g. We are fometimes puzzled to remember fome word or matter, and in order to the finding it we endeavour to recollect every thing allied, to recollect the letter (fometimes by recalling different letters of the alphabet into the mind) or fyllable that begun or even ended &c. the word; or fome circumftance connected with the matter; and from this recollection we often find the word, or matter more or less accurately, accord

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according as its remembrance remains more or lefs perfect.

5. The memory from fome circumftances often does not recollect others allied, but from other or feveral others united may: e. g. We often from the name cannot recollect our past knowledge of the person, or the name from feeing the perfon, but from this we may remember to have feen him before; and fometimes though we do not recollect him from feeing his person, we remember him from seeing his perfon and other circumstances.

6. By memory our ideas are affociated together, and from thence arifes all our knowledge and converfe: it is the foundation of our knowledge, for by it we argue from the past to the future; and it is the foundation of our converfe, for by hearing the discourse of another, we are led to the recollection of fomething analogous to what has been faid, which we return in answer: the mind from its faculties often annexes ideas together, which were never before affociated in the memory.

7. The mind in all its faculties is limited, it can only distinguish even fimple ideas to a certain degree, which confiderably differs in different perfons; e. g. The difference between two colours or two founds nearly the fame, or two angles or magnitudes nearly equal, can often

not be perceived; and when the mind can perceive no difference between colours or founds, angles or magnitudes, it will conclude them to be the fame or equal.

It is known, that the rays of light coming from the fame point of an object do never perfectly unite on the fame point of the retina, but intermix with rays coming from adjacent points; and if they do not feparate too much. from each other, or the force of the rays coming from the other points bear too great a ratio to the force of the rays from the first mentioned point, the vifion will be diftinct and not to be diftinguished from perfect vifion; in which all the rays from one point of the object are supposed collected in the fame point of the retina and not intermixt with other rays; and the fame may be predicated of all correfpondent points.

The like may be affirmed concerning founds and ideas arifing from the other fenfes; and this limitation of our faculties may hereafter become the fubject of calculation.

8. Several caufes, which produce fimple ideas, may when united and acting together on the fame point of the body or nearly, produce one fimple idea in the mind, and that most frequently not the fame with any of the beforementioned, e. g. The caufes of feveral colours united

united on the fame point of the retina generally produce a different colour; and fo of several founds united on the fame point of the auditory nerve; and confequently the cause of a simple idea is often reducible into feveral causes of other fimple ideas.

9.

The ideas received in the mind are not only different as the object from which they proceed is different, but alfo as the conftitution of the organ of the precipient is different; e. g. Let a man have a microfcopic eye, or which is the fame, view the object by help of a microscope, how different does it appear from that seen by the common or naked eye? the fame object is calculated not only to give different ideas to different fenfes; but also to the fame whether feeing, hearing, &c. in different perfons; or to the fame perfon at different times, or with different instruments interpofed, which may greatly vary the fenfation.

10. Amongst the innumerable fimple ideas, which arife from the different senses, hearing, feeing, tafting, feeling, fmelling; no two are fimilar: the ideas of extenfion, figure (a particular mode of extenfion), and motion received by the eye are quite different from those received by the touch; but being found generally to accompany each other, as they are produced by the fame body, we affociate them together, and give them the fame name.

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11. Innumerable fympathies from nature pervade the body (as is known to all the faculty of phyfick), which are often different in different conftitutions: innumerable affociations of ideas arife from nature, from cuftom and habit and from artifice; fome ideas of fight give pleasure to the whole, and fome to parts of the body; others produce difguft, horror or pain; fome founds create pleasure to the whole constitution, others tremblings, rage, fright, &c.

12. Some are general affociations; for example, when the ideas are derived from the fame caufe; the idea of extenfion from fight and touch; of a carriage from the found of it: others belong only to particular perfons occafioned either by their conftitutions or particular events of their lives; general associations of ideas and of facts deducible from uniform experience constitute the foundation or principles of human knowledge. All languages confift in the affociation of founds with other ideas.

13. As the fame machine to a person skilled in its several parts appears much more complicate than to a person ignorant of them, who knows not how to distinguish the different parts; fo an idea may appear more complex to one than another; and probably the idea, which firft enters the mind must be fimple; afterwards the