(c) Belonging to the commercial or legal language, but most conveniently treated here, are the phrases by which properties or estates are spoken of as bringing in certain rents or subject to certain public liturgies. A species of popular personification has been at work here. E. g. Dem. 27, 64 ὁ δ' ἐμὸς (οἶκος) τριηραρχεῖν εἰθισμένος καὶ μεγάλας εἰσφορὰς εἰσφέρειν; Isai. 7, 32. 42; 8, 35 οἰκίαν μoboçoрovσay; Dem. 27, 60; 36, 11. Here belongs also the use of xivduveúety of money and property (p. 10); for the technical use of slotéval of the introduction of lawsuits, see Part II, Verbs of Motion. (d) The trite use of verbs of saying, showing and the like with documentary words, such as ἐπιστολή, γραφή, γράμματα (‘letter', ‘inscription”), στήλη, μαντεία, μαντεῖον, χρησμός, remains to be noticed. The principle involved as noticed by Rehdantz (Dem. Ind.1 λéyɛ»), is that the Greek often treats as a person whatever contains or represents the thought of a person, just as on a larger scale the language is disposed to attribute distinct personality to thought and expression in general (see under λóyos, p. 18 f.). In such phrases the Greek does not distinguish between the letter and its writer, or the oracle and its giver (μavtɛtov used in both senses). Often letter and person are freely coordinated in the same sentence: Aisch. 2, 92 ὥς φησι Χάρης ὁ στρατηγὸς καὶ ἡ ERIOτolý; Dem. 19, 44; cf. Ant. 1, 2. General examples are as follows: Th. 7, 10 Èπiotoàǹy dŋlovaav totáde; ib. 16, 1; 1, 129 in. 137, 4; Dem. 9, 41 fin. tí oʊv déɣei tà ɣpáμμata ('the inscription'); Αρθμιος” φησίν, κτέ.; 19, 271 ἀκούετε τῶν γραμμάτων λεγόντων; Hdt. 7, 228. 220; Xen. Hell. 1, 1, 23; Dem. 19, 299 ynoì dè ʼn pavtɛía; Ar. Eq. 128 6 xpnoμòs ävtizpus λéyet; ib. 121. 177; cf. Ar. Pl. 55. Bolder uses are to be seen in Aisch. 2, 128 λαβέ μοι τὴν ἐπιστολήν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι μεγάλα τὴν πόλιν παραλογίζεται; Dem. 19, 15 ἐπιστολὰς ἔπεμψεν ὁ Φίλιππος καλούσας ὑμᾶς, οὐχ ἵνα ἐξέλθοιτε, ἀλλ ̓ ἵνα κτέ.; Dem. 21, 54 (αἱ μαντείαι) προστάττουσι; Th. 2, 17 (διακωλύειν). For similar uses of technical legal terms, such as νόμος, ψήφισμα, rpaq, with verbs of saying and showing, see p. 17, and for the frequent use of entoτolý with verbs of coming, see Part II, Verbs of Motion. 663 The legal and political language which finds its chief expression in the orators, has developed many special technical terms which are treated as independent agents and associated with verbs of action. Of these personifications by far the most characteristic and the most fa II. Legal Language. miliar is that of νόμος, which has come to be one of the most frequent subjects occurring in the orators. No other abstract conception is so thoroughly and so absolutely personal to the Greek mind except the conception of πόλις (also drawn from political life), and possibly that of λόγος. We are almost justified in saying that vóμos has a double nature and represents both itself and νομοθέτης, for which it is often an abbreviated form and for which it can often be actually substituted; we frequently find the two freely alternating in the same passage, as Aisch. 1, 13-20, or the one is to be supplied from the other, as Dem. 24, 34-36. The stage of conscious personification has long since been past with this word, and very bold figures must be used if the force of the personification is to be clearly felt. The number of verbs with which vópos is freely associated is almost unrestricted; most frequent are verbs of commanding or forbidding, permitting or preventing, of saying, showing, determining, acquitting, convicting, punishing, succoring (βοηθεῖν), saving, harming, giving, promising, demanding (ἀξιοῦν), making and prevailing. ó (a) The usage of the orators may be illustrated from Lysias and Demosthenes: Lys. I, 34 ἐμοῦ οἱ νόμοι οὐ μόνον ἀπεγνωκότες εἰσὶ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κεκελευκότες ταύτην τὴν δίκην λαμβάνειν; Ι, 32 ὁ νόμος (οἱ νόμοι) κελεύει, and often; 10, 6. 22, 6 ἀπαγορεύει; 15, ΙΙ κωλύει; 28, 13 ισχύει. Similarly with ὑπό after a passive verb: 1, 49 ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τοὺς πολίτας ἐνεδρεύεσθαι; [2], 19. 61.-Dem. 20, 155 τὸν νόμον ὃς διαρρήδην λέγει, ib. 16o; 22, 6. 57 ; 23, 62 ἠκούσατε τοῦ νόμου λέγοντος ἄντικρυς, 37, 19; 21, 48 ἀκούετε τοῦ νόμου τῆς φιλανθρωπίας, ὃς οὐδὲ τοὺς δούλους ὑβρίζεσθαι ἀξιοῖ; 21, 43 οὐκ ἴσην τὴν ὀργὴν ἔταξεν ὁ νόμος. ἔπειθ' οἱ φονικοὶ τοὺς μὲν θανάτῳ ζημιοῦσι, τοὺς δὲ φιλανθρωπίας ἠξίωσαν; 21, 1 ἃς ἵνα κωλύηθ ̓, οἱ νόμοι συνήγαγον ὑμᾶς. So also ὁ νόμος (οἱ νόμοι) κελεύει 20, 89, and in a similar sense λέγει, 8, 28. 21, 9; προστάττει 21, 165. 23, 63; οὐκ ἐᾷ 20, 147. 22, 8 ; ἀπαγορεύει 23, 28. 35 ; δίδωσι 20, 154. 23, 56; ὑπισχνείται 21, 30. 210; παρέχει 24, 193; τιμωρεῖται 24, 215; ἀπολύει 38, 5 ; διορίζει 23, 34. 36, 26 ; διαιρεῖ 20, 28 ; φράζει 24, 68. 76; φησίν 20, 156 ; σῴζει 24, 156. 216; λύει 24, 34. 58 ; ἰσχύει 24, 135; καθίστησι 3, 11. 22, 34; βλάπτει 3, 10. 20, 49.-Compare also Ant. 3, β, 9 ἀπολύει δὲ καὶ ὁ νόμος ἡμᾶς, ᾧ πιστεύων ὡς φονέα με διώκει; Aisch. 3, 169 ἵνα μὴ δυσμενής ᾖ τοῖς νόμοις οἱ σῴζουσι τὴν δημοκρατίαν; cf. 3, 22; Th. 2, 53, 4 θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἢ ἀνθρώπων νόμος οὐδεὶς ἀπεῖργε; 3, 45, 3. Cases of still bolder and freer personification are not rare. In Pindar (frg. 151 Böckh) vóμos ('custom') is the king who rules over all (cf. also Plat. Symp. 196, c), and in an uncertain tragedian is called the greatest god known to mankind (inc. trag. frg. 394 N.). In Herodotos (7,104) Demaratos declares that Law is a master more dreaded and more strictly obeyed by the Spartans than the Persian king by his subjects. This personification is not confined to poetry and imaginative prose, but apparently belongs also to the popular language; it is put by Lysias and Aristophanes into the mouth of citizens of the humbler sort. Thus in Lysias Euphiletos in slaying the adulterer declares that he perishes not at his hands, but at the hands of the Law. In Lysias and Demosthenes purpose (yváμŋ1: Lys. 1, 35), foresight (προορᾶσθαι) and precaution (εὐλαβεῖσθαι) are attributed to the laws. According to Aischines (3, 16) and Hypereides (6,25) the voice (pwrn, þléyyeolai) of the law ought to be obeyed rather than the voice of the advocate or the tyrant. Demosthenes in one passage (21, 224) even thinks it worth while to remind the judges that the laws are after all only written statutes, and possess only moral force; they cannot actually bar the way of the wrongdoer or hasten to the relief of the injured. The conversation of the Laws with Socrates in Pl. Krito 50, a ff. is a well-known passage. Finally the laws are frequently found with the personal designations φύλαξ, συνήγορος, βοηθός, and they are freely co-ordinated with personal subjects, e. g., 'the gods and the laws,' 'I and the law.' E. g. Lys. 1, 26 οὐκ ἐγώ σε ἀποκτενῶ, ἀλλ ̓ ὁ τῆς πόλεως νόμος ; Ar. Ekkl. 1055 ἀλλ ̓ οὐκ ἐγώ, ἀλλ ̓ ὁ νόμος ἕλκει σε; Aisch. 3, 16 ὅταν ἑτέραν μὲν φωνὴν ἀφιῇ ὁ νόμος, ἑτέραν δὲ ὁ ῥήτωρ (a bold metaphor praised by Plin. Ep. 9, 26, 11); Dem. 54, 17 oi vóμoi kai τὰς ἀναγκαίας προφάσεις, ὅπως μὴ μείζους γίγνωνται, προείδοντο ; 24, 57 ὁ νόμος οὑτοσὶ εὐλαβούμενος τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπεῖπε (in this last passage Blass proposes to remove the bold personification by deleting óv., but the correction appears unnecessary; the language of 24, 36 is still bolder, but here the editors are perhaps justified in supplying νομοθέτης as the subject from a preceding νόμος); 24, 38 ἐφ' ἑκάστην ἀπαντᾶ τὴν ὁδὸν τῶν ἀδικημάτων (ὁ νόμος), κωλύων καὶ οὐκ ἐῶν βαδίζειν τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας ὑμῖν; cf. Aisch. 3, 37 ἐγὼ δὲ παρέξομαι συνηγόρους τοὺς νόμους τοὺς ὑμετέρους (I will let your laws plead my case'); 1, 14 (φύλαξ); Dem. 24, 107 τοὺς τῷ γήρᾳ βοηθοὺς λυμαίνει, οἱ καὶ ἀναγκάζουσι τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς γονέας τρέφειν; Aisch. 3, 196 πολιτείᾳ, 1 1 Similarly in Latin, Plin. Ep. 1, 14, 9 leges civitatis, quae vel in primis census hominum spectandos arbitrantur. ἣν οἱ θεοὶ καὶ οἱ νόμοι σῴζουσι; ib. 4 (οὔθ ̓ οἱ νόμοι οὔθ ̓ οἱ πρυτάνεις); 2, 184. See also Hense, p. III. (b) A somewhat different but equally free use of vóμos as subject is to be seen in the speeches of Demosthenes against the proposed laws of Leptines, Aristokrates, and Timokrates (Orr. XX, XXIII and XXIV). The law attacked is treated as a moral person, and in respect to the effects it will produce is held. to as strict accountability as the publicist who has proposed it. E. g. Dem. 24, 209 νόμον τέθεικεν, ὃς οὐκ ἀνοίγνυσι τὸ δεσμωτήριον, ἀλλὰ καθαιρεί, προσπεριείληφε δὲ καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια; 20, 50 τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν πονηρᾶς δόξης ἀναπλήσει; 20, 155 ὁ νόμος οὗτος τοῦτ ̓ ἀδικεῖ, ὅτι κτέ. (the law is the criminal in making virtue of no avail'); 20, 4. 10. 17. 34. 55, etc.; 24, I. 43. 91. 94. 138, etc. A similar use of ψήφισμα is found in 23, 103. 140 and in Lyk. 7; compare also γράμμα used of the clause of a treaty in Th. 5, 29, 3 : τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα μάλιστα τὴν Πελοπόννησον διεθορύβει καὶ ἐς ὑποψίαν καθίστη. (c) Following the analogy of νόμος, many other technical legal terms are freely placed as subjects, chiefly with verbs of saying, commanding, showing and witnessing; thus most often. ψήφισμα:-Lys. 13, 50 πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ψηφίσματα αὐτοῦ καταμαρτυρεί, διαρρήδην ἀγορεύοντα ... ἔπειτα ἡ κρίσις διαρρήδην λέγει; ib. 28; ib. 71 τὸ ψ. δηλώσει; ib. 72 τὸ ψ. ἐλέγξει; Dem. 20, 42. 116; 51, 18; Dein. 1, 80 φησὶ τὸ ψήφισμα; Aisch. 2, 98 τὸ ψ. προσέταττεν; ib. 91; Dem. 24, 29 Tò V. Ékéλevev; 51, 1; 24, 101; 8, 6; 20, 132; Dein. 2, 23; Aisch. 2, 66 ποιεῖ μου τὴν δημηγορίαν ὁ μὲν κατήγορος διαιρετήν, τὸ ψήφισμα δὲ καὶ τἀληθὲς μίαν ; Hyp. I, col. I. Compare also the personification of ψήφισμα in the celebrated passage Dem. 18, 188: τοῦτο τὸ ψ. τὸν κίνδυνον παρελθεῖν ἐποίησεν ὥσπερ νέφος (' the decree issued forth and the danger passed away like a cloud'), and the metaphorical use of πινάκιον in Dem. 8, 28: μικρὸν π. ταῦτα κωλῦσαι δύναιτ ̓ ἄν ('a very small tablet of impeachment would effectually put a stop to all this”). Like other publicist's terms, ψήφισμα is freely used with νικᾶν——the decree was carried ', Dem. 24, 27; 19, 43-and the terms φεύγειν and ἀποφεύγειν are frequently applied to it in accordance with the processes of Attic law, as Dem. 23, 58. 98; 18, 222. Other technical terms similarly used are δόγμα, προβούλευμα, γραφή, μαρτυρία, στήλη, γράμμα, συνθῆκαι, ψῆφος: Aisch. 2, 60. 61; 3, 126; Ant. I, 2 ὡς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἡ γραφὴ λέγει; Dem. 29, 9 τῶν μαρ τυριῶν ὅσαι αὐτοῦ κατεμαρτύρουν; ib. 7; And. I, 116 ἡ στήλη κελεύει; Dem. 20, 128 ἀκούετε τῶν ἀντιγράφων της στήλης κελευόντων; ib. 130; Th. 6, 55, 1; Dem. 45, 34; Isokr. 8, 20 ai σvvēĥкαι πроσтáTTOVσl; ib. 16; 14, 10; And. 3, 14; cf. Isokr. 4, 176; Hyp. 5, 22 f. (кpateîv); Lys. 13, 37 τὴν καθαιροῦσαν ψῆφον; Dem. 19, 66 τὴν σῴζουσαν ψῆφον; cf. also 23, 167. III. The Learned Under a third head may be classed (a) expressions referring to speech and its literary forms, all embraced in Greek under the comprehensive term óyos and closely related words, (b) subjects relating to education and philosophy, (c) terms connected with civil and Much the larger number of such subjects is naturally furnished by Isokrates, who is essentially an essayist on rhetoric, education and large political questions. political life. (a) Rhetorical Terms. The same tendency of the Greek spirit, which, as we have seen (pp. 14, 17), causes it to attribute speech and other personal actions to the letter or the decree as representative of their writers, leads in a broader field to the free Λόγος. personification in language of all the products of thought, notably of λóyos and kindred notions. We sometimes speak even in modern English of an author's speech or essay as advising and warning us or as approving or disapproving certain actions, but outside of technical language we rarely attribute such personal actions to the speech unless the reference to the person or the author is kept clearly in mind. It is only in book reviews or in philosophical and technical writings that we are likely often to meet with such phrases as 'This treatise seeks (Gk. Boúderai) to prove,' or 'This book condemns (Gk. éminλTTEL) such views.' This usage remains restricted and occasional in English, and has no such place in the popular consciousness as the Greek usage appears to have. We may say that the Greek often goes as far in common language as the English goes in technical language, and in philosophical writing the Greek goes, on the whole, much further. Many of the Greek phrases may be paralleled in the formal style of older English, which is itself based largely upon classical models, but few writers of the present day would write as boldly as Isokrates, for example, in addressing Philip: Isokr. 5, 137 ἣν ὑπολάβῃς μὴ μόνον τὸν λόγον τοῦτόν σε παρακαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς προγόνους καὶ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων ἀνανδρίαν. We may distinguish at least two classes in the use of these rhetorical terms. (a) The speech or writing (Aóyos) represents the writer who composes it (Moyoypápos), and refers to the writer's purpose and opinion. The verbs which occur most commonly are those of |