improvement of our military system is earnestly recommended.

In the second chapter, a comparative view of the force and resources of the French and British Empires is drawn. In this case, the author endeavours to lay aside all national prejudices, and begs the same impartiality on the part of his reader. The proportion of population against us is concluded at five to one. The revenues. of each empire are next considered, but these cannot be determined with so much accuracy. The difference, in favor of France, is computed at perhaps not three to one; but it is added, that our enemy can effect more with the same sum than we can. Whether our national wealth be supposed to consist in commerce or agriculture, it is contended, that our finances are verging to ruin, and more certainly, if dependent on the former. In the energy of Executive Government, the author thinks that France may probably appear to possess a decided superiority; and allows, that military talents lead to eminence in that country, whilst in England it is chiefly acquired by parliamentary abilities, and a knowledge of finance, and domestic affairs. We are said to be so far confident in our patriotism and courage as to believe that we cannot be subdued; but examples are drawn from history to show that this confidence, is entirely vain.

These two chapters, though written according to the state of affairs in 1808, will perhaps be equally applicable at present: whether just ly applicable, it is not the business of this Review to pronounce. It is not asserted that these consequences must unavoidably take place, but that they will take place, if our military policy be not altered. VOL. I.

The author proceeds, in the third chapter, to notice our colonial possessions, which, while of themselves they seldom, or never, afford a revenue more than sufficient to defray the expense of their civil government, in his opinion, considerably diminish our disposable military force; and that even these could not be retained if the naval power of France should ever equal our own. The chief complaint against our colonies is, that they are on too small a scale. Sicily, as a colony, might add much to our military strength and resources; yet, as an ally, is represented as affording but small, if any, advantages. Whilst we, by naval victories, though splendid, gain nothing permanent in the re sources on which naval power depends, France, we are told, is pursuing a system of conquest which is continually adding more men to her armies, and more money to her treasury.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters are devoted to the discussion of martial policy, by which is meant the spirit and views with which war may be conducted. The policy to which we owe our greatness is considered as having become too narrow for the present times, and our military disasters as the natural result of our measures. For this dissertation we must refer our readers to the work itself.

The war in Spain forms the subject of the seventh chapter. We cannot enter into a full detail of the arguments of the author for the prosecution of vigorous measures: we however make the following short extract, which will partly disclose his sentiments on the importance of our undertaking in support of that nation.

U

Reasoning, however, upon the principles which have already been developed, I must entirely deny that the dismemberment of the French empire, were we to effect it, could justly be considered as a measure of pure generosity, on our part, to any foreign prince or nation it is with us, a measure of self-preservation and of necessity; and we are principals in every war that tends to that object.

Had such been our views, there is no country in the world, which we could have chosen for the theatre of action, where all imaginable circumstances, physical as well as moral, could have possibly favored us so much as they did in Spain. We did not enter the lists, in alliance with a weak and corrupted government, such as formerly ruled that country; which, upon the first reverse, would have submitted to the enemy, giving up half its territory, and declaring war against us, as the price of peace. We had the whole Spanish nation for our allies. The extraordinary hatred and antipathy of that nation to the French: their desire of amity with England, which has even grown into a proverb in their language; the mountainous and difficult nature of their country, which makes up, in a considerable degree, for their inferiority in point of discipline and of military skill: its peninsular form, which throws such a vast advantage in war, into the hands of the power that rules by sea: every thing, in short, boded success to us and to our allies: the only thing against us was our national system of always making war by halves.

Owing to the oppressive nature of their former political and religious in

stitutions, the people of Spain, with many excellent qualities, can boast of few men of liberal education, or of minds cultivated by study and reflection. Hence they carry, to a great degree, a disposition which they have in common with all nations that possess much national pride; they are sanguine in the extreme, wonderfully credulous of every thing that flatters their wishes, however improbable; and equally incredulous of every thing to the contrary. They never saw clearly the extent of their danger. When they first took up arms, they were insensible of their own defects, and they generally believed that their raw levies, by virtue of enthusiasm, would carry every thing before them, and march straight to Paris. pp. 233-235.

Since, according to our present system, Major Pasley considers our safety and independence solely supported by our naval superiority, the advantages which Spain would afford France in enabling her to rival, if not overpower, us on the ocean, are strongly enforced as a proof of the prudence of maintaining an alliance with that country, or, at least, of keeping it out of the hands of Buonaparte.

The author next treats of the necessity of mixing politics with war. In vain, he asserts, does a General command brave and disciplined troops, in vain is he victorious, unless aided by the labors of the statesman and legislator.

After having employed the ninth chapter in reasoning on the necessity of adopting offensive measures against France, and the impolicy and injustice of re-establishing foreign princes unconditionally, Major Pasley takes a general view of the state of foreign affairs, and of the terms on which we ought to treat with our allies and with our enemies.

We must in this case also refer to the work, since, from the nature of the discussion, we could not give any satisfactory abbreviation without extending the account to too great length.

From the eleventh chapter we insert the following passage relative to the true definition of a military nation.

A kind of obscure feeling seems generally to exist in England, that we shall never succeed in war by land, until we become a military nation. The only proper definition of a military nation, that can be given, is one that prospers in war; to attempt to demonstrate the truth of the above proposition would consequently be superfluous: but as this definition is much too vague to convey any distinct notion, to the minds of those who have not deeply reflected upon the subject, an inquiry into what truly constitutes a military nation, may be of the greatest service, particularly as no author, to my knowledge, has yet attempted it.

We confess that we ourselves are not

tainly they have a better claim to that title, at the present moment, than the people of any other country. But as it is impossible to think of the French, without the long train of crimes and miseries which they have inflicted and suffered, without anarchy, despotism, confiscations, massacres, and conscriptions, passing in review before us, we are unfortunately too apt to associate these horrible ideas with their success in war, and consequently the very thought of our becoming a military nation (which we fancy the French to be,) always makes us shudder, in spite of our secret sense of the necessity of it. Nothing, however, can be more erroneous than such a notion. The successes of the French have been gained, not by means, but in spite, of their sufferings and injustice. Cruelty and heroism are so seldom combined in the same person, that the notion, that those hands only which have been stained with the blood of fellow-citizens are fit to wield the sword of war, is very unphilosophical; and the opinion, that they alone, who have trampled upon the laws at home, or who tremble for their lives and property, at the smallest caprice of a domestic tyrant, are capable of vanquish ing the enemies of the state abroad, is, in itself, equally false and pernicious. pp. 456,7.

In the twelfth chapter, which concludes this volume, it is argued that, by pursuing proper means, Great Britain possesses military forces sufficient, and an opportunity favorable, to crush the empire of the French, and that vigor, not capability, is wanting on our part. With a change of circumstances, we ought to adopt a change of measures; but Major Pasley contends that we are adhering to a system which may have been wise and necessary, yet from the present state of affairs requires a thorough alteration and amendment. Our policy is not condemned as having from the beginning been erroneous, but is represented as having from the course of things, become in

admitted that the French are; and cer

of the learned Bochart, Spanheim, and the writers of the Universal

History, contends that the scene of the poem lies in Stony, and not in Sandy, Arabia; and he is supported by Scripture, which universally places the land of Uz (afterwards called by the Greeks Idumea) on the south-western coast of the Dead Sea, and surrounded by Kedar, Teman, and Midian, all of them districts of Stony Arabia. Nothing, our author thinks, can be clearer than this evidence, whilst the advocates of the contrary opinion are obliged to maintain their hypothesis by convicting Ptolemy of inaccuracy, and supposing a typographical error of Esitis for Ausitis in that great geographer's text.

Having settled this question, the Author proceeds to consider whether the history of Job is a fabulous narrative, or whether it contains a true account of a man as remarkable for his piety, as for his firmness and resignation in the midst of almost unexampled misfortunes. Mr. G. cannot be persuaded that what has been universally believed for the space of 4000 should be mere poetical fiction, and he thus opposes Professor Michaelis, who grounds his principal objection to the truth. of the narrative, in the absurdity of Satan's conversing with the Deity:

years

"It is altogether incredible," observes M. Michaelis, "that such a conversation ever took place between the Almighty and Satan, who is supposed to return with news from the terrestrial regions." But why should such a conversation be supposed incredible? The attempt at wit in this passage is somewhat out of place; for the interrogation of the Almighty, "Hast thou fixed thy view upon my servant Job, a perfect and upright MAN?" instead of aiming at the acquisition of news, is intended as a severe and most appropriate sarcasm upon

the fallen spirit. "Hast THOU, who, with superior faculties and a more comprehensive knowledge of my will, hast not continued perfect and uprigh', fixed thy view upon a subordinate being, far weaker and less informed than thyself, who has continued so?” The attendance of the apostate at the tribunal of the Almighty is plainly designed to show us, that good and evil angels are equally amenable to him, and equally subject to his authority;a doctrine common to every part of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, and, except in the mythology of the Parsees, recognised by perhaps every ancient system of religion whatever. The part assigned to Satan in the present work is that expressly assigned to him in the case of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden, and of our Saviour in the wilderness; and which is assigned to him generally, in regard to mankind at large, by all the Evangelists and Apostles, whose writings have reached us, both in their strictest historical narratives, and closest argumentative inductions. And, hence, the argument which should induce us to regard the present passage as fabulous, should induce us to regard all the rest in the same light which are imbued with the same doctrine;-a view of the subject which would sweep into nothingness a much larger portion of the Bible than I am confident M. Michaelis would wish to part with.

The other arguments are comparatively of small moment. We want not fable to tell us that good and upright men may occasionally become the victims of accumulated calamities; for it is a living fact, which, in the mystery of Providence, is perpetually occurring in every country: while as to the roundness of the numbers by which the patriarch's possessions are described, nothing could have been more ungraceful or superfluous than for the poet to have descended to units, had even the literal numeration demanded it. And, although he is stated to have lived a hundred and forty years after his restoration to prosperity, and in an æra, in which the duration of man did not perhaps much exceed that of the present day, it should