Chap. 8.

according to which, as the grand Exemplar, all were made: The Eternal Wifdom, which comprized all in it felf, produced all in time.

Another objection which Epicurus made against Providence, was this: God, being bleffed in himself, must not trouble or disparage himself by taking care of thefe inferior things. But this is as great non-fenfe as the other: What! can there be trouble in a pure Act, in one who can do every thing by a word of power, who needs only to fpeak, and the thing is done? May there be a difparagement in ruling over what he hath made? Are not thefe inferior things. the works of his hands? If not, how came they out of nullity? If so, how doth he disparage himself by ruling over his own works? If it be a difparagement to care for them, was it not foto create them? Nay, as St. Ambrofe hath obferved, not to make them was no injustice; not to care for them being made, re fumma in- is great inclemency. But the greatest solution of all, we have in Chrift; in him we plainly fee the Son of God, very God, not only taking care about his creatures, but (which is a condefcenfion infinitely lower, though without difparagement) affuming a creature, an humane nature, into his own Sacred Perfon. No man may now dream that Providence doth in the least difparage the Deity.

Non feciffe nulla injusti

tia, non cura

clementia.

Officier.1. I. c. 13

Leaving Epicurus, I pafs unto another exception: There may be a Providence over fome things, but furely not over the free acts of men. Epicurus thought fome things too low for Providence; others think human acts, because free, too high for it. Thus Cicero Dei, l. 5. c. 9. thought, that if there were a certain order of things and causes, human Liberty would be fubverted; there would be no room for Laws, or Exhortations, or

Auft. de Civ.

Jerom ad Cte

Virtues, or Vices, or Rewards, or Punishments. This Chap. 8. made St. Auftin pafs that cenfure upon him, Dum vult facere liberos, facit facrilegos: While he would make men free, he made them facrilegious. Thus the Pelagians affirmed, That the will is destroyed if it want the help of another; That, there being a free-fiphont. c. 3. will, God is no further neceffary to us: indeed the Auguft. de poffe, or power, is from God; but the velle, or willing, Grat. Chrifti, is only from our felves. Thus Socinus diftinguishes be- cap. 4. tween the internal and external acts of men; the in- Prelect. Theol. ternal are only in mans power, as not belonging to cap. 7. the administration of the world: the external may fall under Providence, but not the internal. Volkelius and others go the very fame way.

This Opinion to me is a very impious one; it highly difparages Divine Providence: it is in effect as much as to fay, God hath nothing to rule over but the Brutal World, the Rational is loft out of his dominions. It takes away the glory and crown of Providence, which rules over free Agents in fo rare and admirable a manner, that they, though moving upon the wings of liberty, do infallibly hit the mark. It fubverts the certainty of Providence, and that in thofe things which were pofitively decreed by God, and of the highest moment to men. What more pofitively decreed, or more highly momentous to the Jewish Church, than those two famous deliverances from Egypt and Babylon? Or what more pofitively decreed, or more highly momentous to the whole world, than the fufferings of our Saviour? Yet these things being to come to pass by the free acts of men, and thofe free acts not being under Providence, the event must needs be pendulous and uncertain, as those free acts upon which the event deA a 2

pends,

Ames. Bell.

Arb. c. 2.

1.. 2. c. 30.

Chap. 8. pends, are. Providence, having no foveraign dominion over those free acts, doth not afcertain the Event, but leave it dubious and fluctuating till the human Will determines it felf: And what is this, but to make Providence nothing, and man an independent Agent? And whither doth this tend, but to the utter fubverfion of Piety? We should say in piety, If Ener. de lib. the Lord will, we will do this or that, Jam. 4.15; but according to this opinion, God himself may fay, If man will, I will do this or that. This made the faDe Caufa Dei, mous Bradwardine juftly cry out, Quis enim Theologi cus aut Catholicus, imo vel Hæreticus, Schifmaticus aut Paganus audeat fe præponere Deo fuo, dicere feipfum Dominum, Deum fuum fervum, feipfum. fuperiorem, Deum. inferiorem, feipfum architectum & principalem artificem, Deum vero fubfervientem & fuum quodammodo inftrumentum? What Divine or Catholick, yea, what Heretick, Schifmatick, or Pagan, dares prefer himself, before his God, to fay, that he is Lord, God the fervant; he Superior, God inferior; he the Architect and principal Artificer, God fubfervient, and a kind of inftrument under him? Moreover, it directly. contradicts Scripture. God touched their hearts, and Saul had a band, 1 Sam. 10. 26. God opened the heart of Lydia, and the Gospel had entrance, Aus 16. 14. God turneth the Kings heart, and that whither he will, Prov. 21. 1. God draws men, and they come to Chrift, John 6.44. God put it into the Kings heart, and the Temple was beautified, Ezra 7. 27. God worketh to will and to do, of his own good pleasure, Phil. 2. 13. None of these can be true, if Providence rule not over the wills and hearts of men: but that it doth fo, is not only clear in these instances, but in an eminent manner appears in Jefus Chrift;

his humane Will was free, and yet infallibly guided Chap. 8. by his divine. Hence he tells us, That he did nothing of himfelf, Joh. 8. 28; nay, and that he could do nothing of himself, Joh. 5. 19. The divine Will inclined the whole fuppofitum, and moved the humane, and that, as the learned Profeffor fpeaks, Non fuaforiè Dr. wards Detantum, fed efficienter & phyficè ; that man therefore, ter. fol. 1 20. who thinks his humane Will above Providence, prefumes his Liberty to be above that in the humane Nature of our Saviour.

But here it is objected, that if Providence rule over the Will, humane Liberty is destroyed.

10.

I answer, Humane Liberty is fo highly magnified by fome, that they speak very strangely, touching the things of God. Hence Penottus dreams, that the divine Decrees touching humane Acts, are not to be conceived as a definitive fentence, but as a pendent one, till the humane Will have determined it felf God must wait, till he fee what Man will do. Nay, hence Schlictingius confidently lays it down, that the Contr. Meifn. infallible Prescience of God infers a neceffity upon de Præd. fol humane Acts, as well as his abfolute Decree; that neceffity, if granted, takes away all Piety. It feems, that man may be free, God muft not only fufpend his Eternal Decrees, but part with his Prefcience alfo. Thus prefumptuous is the pride of Man in asferting his own Liberty; but for the thing it felf, Providence and humane Liberty do very well confist together. Providence is not deftructive, but falvative of humane Liberty: it impofes upon humane Acts, not a neceffity of Coaction, but of Immutability only, fuch as no way trenches upon the creatures Freedom. Some, I fuppofe, will not admit that distincti

on,

Chap. 8.

on; but that it is a neceffary one, appears thus. On the one hand it is impoffible, that any act of mans Will fhould fall under a neceffity of Coaction; for then it should will nolent: on the other 'tis impoffible, that any act of mans Will fhould come to pass in any other way than under a neceffity of Immutability. For whatever comes to pafs, before its existence was future; and whatever is future, comes to pass immutably if it was not future before, it cannot come to pafs at all; if it was future before, it comes to pass immutably; for a future cannot ceafe to be future, till it come into actual existence. But to pafs this, I fhall lay down fome Confiderations touching the confiftence of Providence and humane Liberty.

1. It is to be noted, that God is infinite in all Perfections, incomparably transcending all creatures; that all creatures are finite, but as a little drop or dust, a vanity or quafi nothing before him. This Confideration in an humble heart, is able to folve even seeming contradictions. Gods immensity, though as indivifible as a point, comprizes the world without crushing the leaft quantity together. Gods Eternity, though an instant, environs ages without confounding the least fand of temporal fucceffion: And De Gen. ad why may not Gods Will, though in St. Austins phrase it be rerum neceffitas, comprehend created Wills within its Decrees, without any violence or unkind preffure upon their liberty? Ged is infinite, the creature finite; infinite cannot but unmeafurably tranfcend finite; finite cannot but be every way ruleable by infinite. Let us remember, that God is God; and if men deifie their own Free-will, that he is a God above all gods, Pfal. 135.5. And then the next verse will

Liter.1.6.c.15.

be

t