long time, exerts an influence, through habit, even after the withdrawal of the Divine Presence, yet evil and disorder, being introduced by degrees, increase more and more, until, finally, Old Chaos comes again, and total destruction would ensue, did not God once more resume the long-abandoned helm. It is a portion of Plato's works on which but little attention has been bestowed, and yet, in consequence of its always having seemed to us to possess a deep theological interest, we give the passage to our readers at some length, and in a very free version: "God himself, at one time, guides this universe (Švμπоdηyɛi), and turns it round. Again, he abandons it to itself, when the periods of its destined times have received their full complement; when, being animate, and having had wisdom implanted in it from him who harmonized it at the beginning, it commences of its own accord to move in a contrary direction; and this tendency to a retrograde motion arises from an innate necessity of its nature. For to be ever in the same relations (KATà TaỶTÀ), and uniform, and the same, pertains alone to those things which are most divine; but the nature of matter has no share in this dignity. What we name, therefore, the heavens or the universe (ovpavòv кai кóoμov), hath partaken of many blessed things or qualities from him who generated it; still, it has communion with matter, and, on this account, it is impossible that it should be altogether exempt from change, although, as far as it is capable, it moves on in one regular course, in the same and according to the same relations. It is in this way that it gets this property of unrolling, or rolling back, consisting, at first, in the slightest conceivable change or parallax of its previous motion. For anything always to turn itself is impossible, except for Him who is the supreme controller of all moving things; but for this Being to act in a changeable manner, or to turn things, now in this direction, and now in the contrary, is impossible (où déus, is morally impossible). For all these reasons must we say, that the world neither turns itself forever, nor that it is forever turned by God in contrary circuits. Neither must we suppose that two Gods* with opposing purposes conduct its revolutions (μήτ' αὐτὸν στρέφειν ἑαυτὸν ἀεί, μήτ' αὖ ὅλον ὑπὸ θεοῦ στρέφεσθαι ἀεὶ διττὰς καὶ ἐναντίας περιαγωγάς, μήτ' αὖ δύο τινὲ θεὼ φρονοῦντε ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντία στρέφειν αὐτόν), but, as has been said (and which, in fact, is the only supposition left), that, at one time, it is guided by a Divine cause; during which period it receives again the acquired power of life, and an immortality not innate, but imparted to it from the Demiurgus; and then, again, that it goes by itself, being abandoned so long, that even many ten thousand years may be occupied in the revolution." Politicus, 269, P. The myth then proceeds to describe the alternate periods. The first, or that which is under the direct care of the Deity, is represented as the golden age, during which time the earth produces all things spontaneously, without cultivation, and, in general, the order of all things is from death to life. This was the reign of Saturn. Good was *This is in direct opposition to the doctrine laid down in The Laws, where he maintains that there are at least two souls, one good and the other bad, occupied in the movements of the universe. Here, however, he seems to be very much averse to such an opinion, as inconsistent and unnatural. Some would say that this furnishes conclusive evidence that the one or the other, or both of these dialogues, are spurious. If such an argument could be held legitimate, the conclusion would certainly be against the Politicus, since the doctrine of The Laws was followed by all the subsequent Platonists, and regarded as an undoubted position of their master; but, in truth, instead of invalidating either, it only shows how a great mind wavered on the deepest question in philosophy and theology. + It might, however, seem, to some, to be rather a species of inverted death, as during this period the order of all things is so changed, that the old commence a process of return to the vigour of middle age, manhood returns to youth, youth to boyhood, boyhood to infancy, infancy to entire disappearance from the stage of life. In predominant, although there is no little confusion in the account which this splendid myth, in other respects so clear, gives of this period. It at last, however, comes to an end, and when the complement of the times had been filled up, and the change must take place, then, it is said, the Divine Pilot, letting go the helm, retires to his secret place of observation, and destiny and innate tendency are left to turn back the revolutions of the world: τότε δὴ τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης, οἷον πηδαλίων οἴακος ἀφέμενος εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη· τὸν δὲ δὴ κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν Εἱμαρμένη τε καὶ ξύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία, 272, Ε. At the same time, the other Aaíμoves, to whom, as presiding divinities, or angels,* the various parts of the universe had been allotted in subordination to the Supreme Ruler, hear the signal, and retire from their respective provinces. Then commences the predominance of evil. Nature, through all her works, gives signs of wo. First, a strange tremour or com. motion (σɛloμòs πоλùç) is felt in every part of the abandoned world. After a while, however, to employ Plato's imagery, the vessel ceases from the tumultuous surging which at first ensues, and enjoying a calm, gets at length into the new course in which it is destined to proceed. The world goes on for a season with some degree of regularity, in consequence of influences being yet exerted by those laws and principles to which it had been accustomed in that previous state when it was directly under the Divine continuation of the same wild and strange fancy, the dead are said to come out of their graves, and thus to be born again from the earth: ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων αὖ, κειμένων δὲ ἐν γῇ, πάλιν ἐκεῖ ξυνισ ταμένους καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένους, ἕπεσθαι τῇ τροπῇσυνανακυκλουμένης εἰς τἀναντία τῆς γενέσεως. We can hardly help thinking that in this singular myth may be traced the rudiments of an ancient doctrine of a resurrection. The general idea intended by Plato is clear enough, and yet so much confusion rests upon the details, that it sometimes is difficult to decide to which period they in fact belong. * See Note XXXIV., on the Platonic Doctrine of the Animation of care. By slow degrees the former motion, with the order and harmony by which it was accompanied, is diminished, until, having passed the minimum point, it makes a transition to the contrary direction with a constantly accelerated momentum. It is then that the greatest deteriorations and corruptions take place; first, of the vegetable, next, of the animal world, and, finally, of the human race, until here and there a small and wretched remnant alone survive. The old harmony, the remembrance of which had not before been entirely quenched, is now utterly extinct. The former laws of nature are all reversed, until, finally, when on the very verge of utter ruin—τότ' ἤδη ὁ θεὸς, καθορῶν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀπορίαις ὄντα, κηδόμενος ἵνα μὴ χειμασθεὶς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα τόπον δύη, πάλιν ἔφεδρος αὐτοῦ τῶν πηδαλίων γιγνόμενος, τὰ νοσή σαντα καὶ λυθέντα στρέψας, κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶν, ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρω ἀπεργάζεται—“ God, beholding it in great extremity, and being concerned, lest, being overwhelmed in disorder and utterly dissolved, it should plunge again into the limitless, formless region of dissimilitude and chaos, once more seats himself at the helm (from which he had before returned to his secret place of observation, eiç Tǹv аνтой περιπην), and having arrested its weak and dissolved parts in their course to ruin, arranges it again in order, rectifies it, and thus renders it immortal," 273, D. the Heavenly Bodies; and Note LXVII., on the Platonic Doctrine of the Demons or Genii. * Or, in the expressive language of the original, τǹv тоû ñaтpòs diSaxǹv åñoμvnμovɛówv eis dúvaμiv-" Still, as well as it could, remembering the teaching of its father." The allusion seems to be to the fable of Phaëton striving in vain to remember and follow the directions given him by his father, when he so rashly undertook to drive the chariot of the Sun. + Lest it should plunge again into the limitless place of dissimilitude. That is, back again to old chaos. The language strongly calls to mind the of Genesis, i., 2. We find occasionally in Plato, especially in the Timæus, mention made of ȧváyêŋ, or necessity, as some strong and apparently opposing power, on which the Divine energy was constantly exercised, not so much in directly overcoming, as in controlling and directing it to the accomplishment of the Divine purposes. Thus, in the Timæus, 48, A., he speaks of the generation of the world having proceeded from the combined operation of νοῦς and ἀνάγκη, mind and necessity. To the former, however, he ascribes a species of authority, yet of a persuasive rather than of a violent nature: Νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος, τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἄγειν, ταύτη δι' ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος, οὕτω ξυνίστατο Tódε TÒ πãν—" But, since Mind rules Necessity, by persuading her to bring to the best results the most of things as they are generated; thus, in this way, through necessity overcome by rational persuasion, this universe received its construction." By ȧváyкŋ, here, Plato does not mean his evil soul, neither does he generally intend any physical necessity arising from motion as a property of matter (although he and the Greek poets* do sometimes apply the term to what we style the laws of nature, and it has something of this aspect in the present passage from the Timæus), but rather a metaphysical or logical necessity, a necessity existing in the idea of a thing, in its constituting cause, or that which makes it what it is-in its λóyoç, or notion-in short, a necessity of the mind, by which it is compelled to include certain principia in the very definition of any existing or conceivable thing; and hence he employs in respect to it such terms as πείθειν, and πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος, words which would have little or no meaning as applied to a purely physical necessity. * As, for example, Euripides, Troades, 893: Ζεύς, εἶτ ̓ ἀνάγκη φύσεις, εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν. |