. 62

presence or union of theirs is not enough to make them seen, but God must show or exhibit them. And what does God do more than make them present to the mind when he shows them? Of that there is nothing said, to help me over this difficulty, but that, when God shows them, we see them; which, in short, seems to me to say only thus much, that, when we have these ideas, we have them, and we owe the having them to our Maker -which is to say no more than I do with my ignorance. We have the ideas of figures and colours by the operation of exterior objects on our senses, when the sun shows them us; but how the sun shows them us, or how the light of the sun produces them in us, what and how the alteration is made in our souls, I know not. Nor does it appear, by anything our author says, that he knows any more what God does when he shows them us, or what it is that is done in our minds, since the presence of them to our minds, he confesses, does it not." 1

That paragraph will sufficiently illustrate Locke's mode of dealing with Malebranche, if we add to it a sample of his banter. In support of his argument that "we see all things in God," Malebranche said, "The strongest of all reasons is the manner in which the mind perceives all things. It is evident, and all the world knows it by experience, that when we would think of anything in particular, we at first cast our view upon all beings, and afterwards we apply ourselves to the consideration of the object which we desire to think on." "This argument," said Locke," has no other effect on me but to make me doubt the more of the truth of this doctrine. This, which he calls the strongest reason of all,' is built upon matter-of-fact, which I cannot find to be so in myself. I do not observe that, when I would think of a triangle, I first think of all beings,' whether those words 'all beings' be taken here in their proper sense or, very improperly, for being in general. Nor do I think my country neighbours do so, when they first wake in the morning, who, I imagine, do not find it impossible to think of a lame horse they have, or their blighted corn, till they have run over in their minds all beings that are, and then pitch on Dapple, or else begin to think of being in general, which is being abstracted from all its inferior species, before they come to think of the fly in their sheep or the tares in their corn."

It has already been mentioned that Molyneux urged Locke to write a treatise on ethics. "One thing I must

1 An Examination of Malebranche's Opinion,' § 30.
2 Ibid., § 28.

needs insist on to you," he wrote in 1692, " that you would think of obliging the world with a treatise of morals, drawn up according to the hints you frequently give in your Essay,' of their being demonstrable according to the mathematical method."1

Though, by the view I had of moral ideas whilst I was considering that subject," Locke wrote in answer, "I thought I saw that morality might be demonstrably made out, yet whether I am able so to make it out is another question. Every one could not have demonstrated what Mr. Newton's book hath shown to be demonstrable. But to show my readiness to obey your commands, I shall not decline the first leisure I can get to employ some thoughts that way.

Molyneux's request was repeated several times and echoed by others. "As to a treatise of morals, "Locke said in 1696, "I must own to you that you are not the only person who has been for putting me upon it; neither have I wholly laid by the thoughts of it. Nay, I so far incline to comply with your desires, that I every now and then lay by some materials for it, as they occasionally occur in the rovings of my mind. But when I consider that a book of offices, as you call it, ought not to be slightly done, especially by me, after what I have said. of that science in my Essay,' and that 'nonumque prematur in annum' is a rule more necessary to be observed in a subject of that consequence than in anything Horace speaks of, I am in doubt whether it would be prudent, in one of my age and health, not to mention other disabilities in me, to set about it. Did the world want a rule, I confess there could be no work so necessary

1 Familiar Letters,' p. 5; William Molyneux to Locke, 27 August, 1692. 2 Ibid., p. 10; Locke to William Molyneux, 20 Sept., 1692.

Et. 62.

nor so commendable. But the gospel contains so perfect a body of ethics, that reason may be excused from that inquiry, since she may find man's duty clearer and easier in revelation than in herself. Think not this the excuse of a lazy man, though it be perhaps of one who, having a sufficient rule for his actions, is content therewith and thinks he may perhaps, with more profit to himself, employ the little time and strength he has in other researches wherein he finds himself in the dark."1

To that decision Locke adhered, and his talked-of treatise never got beyond the noting down of a few rough "materials as they occasionally occurred in the rovings of his mind."2

"You write to me," Locke said in one of his letters to Molyneux, "as if ink had the same spell upon me that mortar, as the Italians say, has upon others, that, when I had once got my fingers into it, I could never afterwards keep them out. I grant that methinks I see subjects enough, which way ever I cast my eyes, that deserve to be otherwise handled than I imagine they have been; but they require abler heads and stronger bodies than I have to manage them. Besides, when I reflect on what I have done, I wonder at my own bold folly that has so far exposed me in this nice and critical, as well as quicksighted and learned, age. I say not this to excuse a lazy idleness to which I intend to give up the rest of my few days. I think every one, according to what way Providence has placed him in, is bound to labour for the public good as far as he is able, or else he has no right to eat."3

1 'Familiar Letters,' p. 143; Locke to William Molyneux, 30 March, 1696. 2 of these the most important was published by Lord King, pp. 306–312. 3Familiar Letters,' p. 71; Locke to William Molyneux, 19 Jan., 1693-4.

6

Locke had certainly already earned his right to eat; but, if he shrank from following his friend's advice that, as soon as the work involved in the perfecting of his Essay concerning Human Understanding' was over, he should apply himself to the preparation of a systematic treatise on ethics, it was only because he thought there was something better for him to do. That thought took shape in the essay on 'The Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures,' which appears to have chiefly occupied him during the early months of 1695.

Writing to Limborch, a year after Locke's death, Lady Masham said of him, "He was born and had finished his studies at a time when Calvinism was in fashion in England. But these doctrines had come to be little thought of before I came into the world, and Mr. Locke used to speak of the opinions that I had always been accustomed to at Cambridge, even among the clergy there, as something new and strange to him. As, during some years before he went to Holland, he had very little in common with our ecclesiastics, I imagine that the sentiments that he found in vogue among you pleased him far more and seemed to him far more reasonable than anything that he had been used to hear from English theologians. But, whatever the cause, I know that since his return he has always spoken with much affection not only of his friends in Holland but also of the whole society of the remonstrants, on account of the opinions held by them." Locke had wandered far from Calvinistic orthodoxy long before he made personal acquaintance with any of the remonstrants; but there can be no doubt that his

1 MSS. in the Remonstrants' Library; Lady Masham to Limborch, 17 Sept., 1705.

Et. 62.

religious opinions were to some extent modified under their influence, nor can it be doubted that they were further influenced by his intimate association with Lady Masham, though this latter may only have encouraged him to talk and think much on theological matters without greatly affecting his views upon them.

In his own deep religious spirit, however, we may find sufficient explanation for his now writing on (6 the reasonableness of Christianity," and this came in almost natural sequence to the work he had already done. In his Essay concerning Human Understanding' he had discussed more or less fully and exhaustively all those important questions that had puzzled the old schoolmen and still perplexed their successors, including some questions that metaphysicians must be content to leave unsolved unless they choose to seek instruction from the theolo gians. In his Letter concerning Toleration' he had very eloquently and boldly, albeit anonymously, asserted the right of every one not only to choose and follow his own modes of religious worship, but also to think out and adhere to his own system of theological belief. It was only proper that he should now set forth his opinions on what, as an earnest and devout Christian, he regarded as the most momentous of all religious questions.

The book grew, almost by accident, out of Locke's interest in the controversy then rife among churchmen, unitarians, and other dissenters about "justification." He was induced, he tells us, to make a careful examination of the New Testament in order, in the first place, to assure himself that "twas faith that justified," and then to discover "what faith that was that justified, what it was which, if a man believed, it should be imputed to