that, from a certain narrowness or self-partiality, you are blind to the fact. Well, that which, under any circumstances, is abundantly possible, you are called on under present circumstances to accept as certainly true. Why are you called on so to accept it? Because your divinely given teacher has so decided. What can be more reasonable than this?

In fact we are confident it will be found, not only that the principle of authority is not adverse to the true interests of philosophy; but, on the contrary, that it is the only conservator of those interests. The one bane both of metaphysics and psychology has ever been, that philosophers have been so deplorably hasty in their philosophical processes; so deplorably careless, as to the sufficiency of their premisses and the correctness of their deductions. The Catholic philosopher enjoys a protection, to which externs are altogether strangers, against these fundamental and capital dangers. Nor in truth do we see how there is any hope of sufficient battle being given to the various forms of philosophical misbelief now prevalent, by any effort which can be put forth by individual philosophers following each his own light. The Church, and the Church alone, can secure that philosophical unity, which is so paramountly needed. A large number of her faithful children, through obedience to her voice, will themselves have learned to see under the light of reason the falsehood of this or that view, with which they may have originally started. Others, who have not yet come themselves to see this, will neverthless firmly believe it, and will abstain from pressing their idiosyncrasies. And thus the army of truth, united in one compact phalanx, will have its due advantage against the disorganized and mutually divergent hosts of error.

There can be no more intensely practical question then, just now, than a consideration of the proper method for ascertaining the Church's voice, on this or that philosophical question. We will therefore conclude, by expressing our own humble suggestions on the subject. Even if our statements were found to be substantially incorrect, we should have done a very important work in inducing more competent thinkers to express themselves clearly on the matter. Our own impression however is, that every loyal Catholic will heartily agree with our principles as far as they go; though it is very probable that there may be others of almost equal importance, which have not occurred to our mind. We will not indeed here speak of the intellectual submission due to explicit ecclesiastical pronouncements, because we have so repeatedly enlarged on this. We will speak merely of the other means

which exist, for knowing the Church's judgment on things philosophical.

1. Every philosophical proposition is infallibly true, which is implied in the Church's dogmatic definitions. One example will sufficiently illustrate our meaning. It is infallibly true that the word "Transubstantiation" aptly and truly expresses that dogma to which the Church applies it. But the word would not truly and aptly express such dogma, unless certain philosophical propositions were correct concerning " substance," "accident," &c., &c. Such propositions therefore must be regarded as infallibly certain.

2. All philosophical principles are infallibly true, which pervade and animate the Church's one recognized dogmatic theology, the scholastic.

3. As to other scholastic philosophical propositions, the degree of ecclesiastical authority which they possess is proportioned to the degree of intimacy and pervasiveness with which they have inflowed into the scholastic theology.

4. Those scholastic philosophical propositions which have not so inflowed at all-however prominent and important they may be in a purely philosophical point of view-are to be judged exclusively by their own merits, and to be weighed impartially in the scale of reason. Yet there is the strongest reason for an à priori anticipation that, for the most part, they will be found far weightier in that scale, than the parallel propositions of conflicting philosophies.

Our readers will have seen, from the preceding remarks, that we are strongly disposed to one opinion, which we have not yet expressly mentioned. Undoubtedly the strictures on scholastic philosophy, uttered by a certain class of Catholics, are not only very superficial, but very disloyal to the Church; betraying indeed a most inadequate appreciation of her infallibility and her authority in teaching. But (speaking with great deference) we do think that some Catholics fall into an opposite extreme. Take e. g. Canon Walker's valuable and thoughtful pamphlet. Certainly we have not observed in it any direct expression on the subject to which we can take exception. Still its general tone almost seems to imply, that any one philosophical proposition, current among the scholastics, has pretty well as much authority as any other; and that the most intellectually dutiful sons of the Church are those, who accept every such proposition simply as a matter of course, without question or delay. Now it is abundantly possible, that there may be reasons for such a view of which we know nothing we only say that we do know nothing of them; that we are not ourselves aware of any ground, on which such an

unquestioning and absolute acceptance of every scholastic philosophical detail can be defended. And the quotations, which we gave a few pages back, show at all events that in this we are following no less grave an authority than that of F. Kleutgen.

The sum of our whole argument may be thus stated :—(1) It is the normal condition of Catholics, that they be absolutely united on philosophical essentials; while there shall be a large amount among them of free discussion, on questions which are secondary indeed, but very far from unimportant. (2) For the last 150 years this normal condition has been suspended, and Catholics have been at mutual variance on the very foundations of philosophy. (3) From this calamity there has arisen, in many parts of the Church, a deplorable neglect of dogmatic theology properly so called; and also a very serious difficulty in the higher education of laymen. (4) From the same cause, it has become impossible to defend successfully on a large scale those fundamental truths of natural religion, which are now the main points of attack among many of the ablest and most cultivated non-Catholic thinkers. No successful war can be waged against the enemies of natural religion, unless there is a large and united phalanx of its upholders. (5) This unspeakably needed philosophical unity might without difficulty be obtained by Catholics (though not by other religionists), if Catholic thinkers would be but duly loyal to the Church's voice. (6) Lastly, such loyalty would be sufficiently secured by the acceptance of certain practical principles, which we have ventured (under correction) to indicate.

We submit these various opinions to the better judgment of Catholic philosophical inquirers. We have long been anxious to urge a Catholic crusade in behalf of natural religion, against the Mills and Bains and other its enemies, who in England are now so active and stirring. But no such crusade is possible, except in proportion as Catholics shall be philosophically united among themselves. We hope then that we may hereafter from time to time apply (as best we are able) the principles suggested in this article, to a treatment of the various vital questions now at issue between religion and its opponents. And the appearance of Canon Walker's pamphlet has suggested to us, that we should commence with that which is the most philosophically fundamental of all those questions; viz. the existence and authority of philosophical axioms. To this therefore we have devoted a separate article in our present number.

Meanwhile we cannot better conclude our present essay,

than by extracting a strong testimony to the scholastic philosophy from a very impartial quarter, the "Saturday Review." The passage terminates an able notice of Mr. Lecky's new work in the issue for May 1st. And this, be it remembered, is the testimony of a Protestant journalist; of one therefore, who is in all probability altogether unacquainted with what scholasticism has done, in the way of building up that unparalleled intellectual fabric the Church's dogmatic theology.

Mind is employed either in tracking out the knowledge of things outside it, or in examining its own thoughts and history. Its activity ought to take both directions: in the middle ages it long shrank, not without intelligible reasons, from the first; but surely the mind cannot be said to be idle when it puts forth its strength on the second. Now, though there was a vast deficiency in that hunting out and ascertaining the facts of nature and history which is so great a work in our days, there was no deficiency in that which is more properly thought-profound and patient and exact consideration of what goes on in the mind, of its efforts to know, of its materials and processes. The schoolmen have become a commonplace for sneers. But no one who ever studied any of the great ones among them could possibly say that mind in them was dormant. No one could ever say that men like Anselm or Aquinas did not treat the most difficult questions with a freedom and originality, which are ordinarily supposed incompatible with their religion. In all that is of most essential consequence, not only in the exhibition of what we know, but in grasping it firmly, clearly, comprehensively, in taking in all the sides of a question, in mapping out all its ramifications, in the sheer hard work of purely intellectual action on ideas and words, they are still our unequalled masters. Most surely, if they led, in their keen and subtle speculations, into many false and useless roads, they paved the way as nothing else did,—as certainly neither ancient speculation nor Mahommedan science did for modern philosophy. They laid out the ground and prepared a language for Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Kant. Those ancient and unwearied pioneers of real thinking deserve more respect than they always meet, from all who know that real thinking is as necessary as the actual discovery of facts, for the true and solid advancement of knowledge.

ART. III. THE RING AND THE BOOK.

The Ring and the Book. By ROBERT BROWNING, M.A., Honorary Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. In Four Volumes. London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1868.

WE

E do not affect to approach our present task with the perfect calmness and temper of judicial indifference. Catholics, it is true, especially in these islands, have become by long habit somewhat callous to calumny; yet it is pitiful to find a man of genius, such as Mr. Browning undoubtedly is, himself the dupe of most fantastic prejudices, and helping to perpetuate and multiply them in the minds of others. Whatever may be the grounds of his contempt for the British public and his conviction that they "like him not," we are bound to say that he could not have taken a readier way of commending himself to their favour than by the construction of a tale in which, conformably to the venerable models of Mrs. Radcliffe's time, nearly all the scoundrels are priests; and though the hero is a priest too, he is so by an unhappy mistake; the author plainly indicating his opinion that being a priest is more of a hindrance than a help to being anything good. Perhaps it will be said that the character which he has drawn of the good Pope Innocent XII. is inconsistent with this view. We do not deny that Mr. Browning has meant to delineate him as, what he was, an eminently wise and holy Pontiff; but he has thought proper, in the execution of his design, to credit Innocent with sentiments and expressions which, however natural they would be in Mr. Browning, are highly improper, absurd, and ridiculous in the personage to whom they are attributed. We do not charge Mr. Browning with having entirely invented the anecdote given in vol. i., p. 17, but, as he tells it, it is not only incredible, but nonsensical. The Pope, we are told, was urged to condemn the errors of "those Jansenists, re-nicknamed Molinists," which he refused to do, on the ground that the world would not hate them so much if there was not some good in them. We are satisfied that even an "Honorary Fellow of Balliol"-by the way, what on earth is an "honorary fellow"?-would feel rather ashamed of himself, if so many errors could be detected in his relation of any incident of secular history as are obvious and glaring in this very curious little story.

In