for their conclusions upon something entirely distinct from argument. We will not here attempt to enter otherwise on this question; but one remark frequently occurs in F. Newman's essays, which is well worthy of consideration, because it leads (we think) to practical inferences of great importance. His opinion then is, that almost all men are good (implicit) reasoners, when they are really earnest in their desire of attaining truth on the matter in hand. This is what accomplished arguers and philosophers are sometimes unwilling to think, but which seems to us true nevertheless.

Nothing is more common among men of a reasoning turn, than to consider that no one reasons well but themselves. All men of course think that they themselves are right and others wrong who differ from them; and so far all men must find fault with the reasonings of others, since no one proposes to act without reasons of some kind. Accordingly, so far as men are accustomed to analyze the opinions of others and contemplate their processes of thought, they are tempted to despise them as illogical. If any one sets about examining why his neighbours are on one side in political questions, not on another; why for or against certain measures, of a social, economical, or civil nature; why they belong to this religious party, not to that; why they hold this or that doctrine; why they have certain tastes in literature; or why they hold certain views in matters of opinion; it is needless to say that if he measures their grounds by the reasons which they produce, he will have no difficulty in holding them up to ridicule, or even to censure. And so again as

to the deductions made from facts which come before us. From the sight of the same sky one may augur fine weather, another bad; from the signs of the times one the coming in of good, another of evil; from the same actions of individuals one moral greatness, another depravity or perversity; one simplicity, another craft; upon the same evidence one justifies, another condemns. The miracles of Christianity were in early times imputed by some to magic, others they converted; the union of its professors was ascribed to seditious and traitorous aims by some, while others it moved to say, "See how these Christians love one another." The phenomena of the physical world have given rise to a variety of theories, that is, of alleged facts, at which they are supposed to point; theories of astronomy, chemistry, and physiology; theories religious and atheistical. The same events are considered to prove a particular providence, and not; to attest the divinity of one religion or another. The downfall of the Roman empire was to Pagans a refutation, to Christians an evidence of Christianity.

Nor can it fairly be said that such varieties arise from deficiency of logical power in the multitude of men. . . This is what men of clear intellects are not slow to imagine. Clear, strong, steady intellects, if they are not deep, will look on these differences in deduction chiefly as failures in the reasoning faculty, and will despise them or excuse them accordingly. .

But surely there is no greater mistake than this. For the experience of

life contains abundant evidence that in practical matters, when their minds are really aroused, men commonly are not bad reasoners. Men do not mistake when their interest is concerned. They have an instinctive sense in which direction their path lies towards it, and how they must act consistently with self-preservation or self-aggrandisement. And so in the case of questions in which party spirit, or political opinion, or ethical principle, or personal feeling, is concerned, men have a surprising sagacity, often unknown to themselves, in finding their own place. However remote the connection between the point in question and their own creed, or habits, or feelings, the principles which they profess guide them unerringly to their legitimate issues; and thus it often happens that in apparently different practices, or usages, or expressions, or in questions of science, or politics, or literature, we can almost prophesy beforehand, from their religious or moral views, where certain persons will stand, and often can defend them far better than they defend themselves.

All this shows, that in spite of the inaccuracy of expression or (if you will) in thought which prevails in the world, men on the whole do not reason incorrectly. If their reason itself were in fault, they would reason each in his own way whereas they form into schools; and that not merely from imitation and sympathy, but certainly from internal compulsion, from the constraining influence of their several principles. They may argue badly, but they reason well; that is, their professed grounds are no sufficient measures of their real ones (pp. 204–5).

Here then, in F. Newman's opinion, is one most principal security for good (implicit) reasoning: simplicity of intention. Let us give an instance.

Suppose then A and B are two merchants, equally well acquainted with matters of business. A however has far more "simplicity of intention" than B; or, in other words, his heart is far more unreservedly devoted to money-getting. B has many literary and social tastes, while A cares for nothing but the main chance. Few men doubt that, this being the case, A will be a far better (implicit) reasoner than B, on the best mode of adding to his fortune. A thousand occasions of turning a penny will suggest themselves to one, which would never occur to the other; or, in other words, a thousand relevant premisses will actively energize in A's mind, which do not enter B's at all. And moreover, when some particular question is raised of unusual commercial moment, B will be very far from bringing the same concentrated energy as A to its examination, and is much less likely, therefore, to arrive at a sound conclusion. In other words, two different phenomena present themselves. A's mind is far more constantly peopled than B's, with the implicit thought of relevant premisses; and (2) his implicit reasoning from those premisses will be far

more accurate.

This principle may be very importantly applied in the sphere of morals and religion. We will assume F. Kleutgen's doctrine, that all men, who reach the age of reason, at once accept various moral truths as axiomatic; and that they are led quite inevitably-unless indeed through their own grave sin-to accept various further doctrines. They accept the doctrine, not only that there is an indefinitely large moral Rule of Life placed in authority over them ;-but also that that Rule is enforced by the Living God, Who created heaven and earth: that to please Him is the most important end of life: that through prayer they may obtain from Him greater strength for that purpose. Now it is self-evident that, among all who admit this fundamental body of truths, those alone act reasonably, who build their whole course of life predominantly on its consideration; who ever seek moral and religious truth with earnestness and simplicity of intention. In other words, a man acts more reasonably-whether he be educated or uneducated, speculative or unspeculative, matters not at all-the more constantly these primary religious doctrines occupy his mind as actively energizing premisses, carrying him forward (implicitly) to a larger and larger assemblage of practical conclusions. These men are infallibly certain of their original premisses; and the validity of their reasoning is largely secured, by their purity and earnestness of intention. They may very possibly be the worst arguers, but they are quite certainly the best reasoners in the whole world. They fly towards moral and religious truth as on eagles' wings; they often discern with the precision of an instinct the path of duty under difficult circumstances; and are found to possess quite an extraordinary power of choosing rightly for themselves, among a multitude of conflicting religious teachers.*

The same truth is exemplified in the case of Catholic dogmata. These were revealed, not for the purpose of lying dormant in the mind, but on the contrary of motiving prac tical action. A Catholic then acts more reasonably and more acceptably to God, in proportion as he labours to view, by the light of these dogmata, every phenomenon of daily life with which they are in any way connected. Or in other words, in proportion as he lives more reasonably and virtuously, the

* Adest in intellectu humano inclinatio quædam naturalis a Sapientissimo Auctore indita, quâ. . ad judicia practica, quæ vitam regendam respiciunt, proferenda pollemus. At id non cæce et sine motivo, sed ex objecti perspicientiâ sive immediatâ ut in primis principiis moralibus, sive mediatâ ut in eorum deductionibus. Deductiones autem ejusmodi . . . a rudibus etiam fiunt.— Liberatore, Ethica, n. 34.

...

more prominent among these verities will be actively energizing as (implicit) premisses in his mind, and will animate his whole view of society and of his fellow-men. This is equally so (just as in the former case) whether he be philosophically cultivated or otherwise; and it is in fact precisely these implicitly deduced conclusions, which are commonly called "Catholic instincts." Again and again it is not less startling than edifying, to find that some saintly Catholic sees his way (as if spontaneously) to complete harmony with the Church's mind on this or that momentous question, on which many Catholics, far abler than himself, still wrangle or rebel.

Old Catholics sometimes good-humouredly laugh at converts, for having introduced into English Catholic talk the word "realise" in a special sense of their own. It must be admitted however, that the idea intended is so important as to need a word for its expression; and this idea is greatly illustrated by what we have been just saying. One very important part of what a convert means when he speaks of "realising certain truths, is the keeping those truths ever in one's mind as actively energizing premisses.

Again from what has been said, you may see the importance of Catholics being surrounded, especially during the period of their education, with what is called "a Catholic atmosphere." NonCatholics erroneously profess a most opposite theory; and allege that moral and religious truth is normally attained, by a free and explicit comparison of conflicting arguments. We shall endeavour to expose this fundamental fallacy a few pages on; but our present concern is with a different objection. Liberals often ridicule this expression, "a Catholic atmosphere," as though it were a mere unfounded and unmeaning figure of speech, devised for the purpose of avoiding argument. We maintain, on the contrary, that never was there an expression more thoroughly philosophical. He is the best Catholic in his views and doctrines, in whom Catholic dogmata are most constantly energizing as active implicit premisses. But no other way can be named in which the mind can be kept so constantly under the control of such premisses, as by the unconscious influence of others, thoroughly possessed by them, with whom it is brought into efficacious contact. And this influence is most curiously parallel in character to those physical agencies, which constitute an atmosphere." Even were it true-which most certainly it is not-that the very few who are highly educated can be sufficiently influenced by argument and explicit statements;-at all events for the vast majority, it is this contagious sympathy which alone has power to imbue them with sound reasoning.

In these later remarks we have been drawing various inferences, from one particular statement which we had made. But a very large number of practical results follow from the whole theory which we have so briefly sketched; and we will conclude our article by selecting a few out of their number.

1. F. Kleutgen's very pregnant remark will have been observed, that it is part of God's tender providence towards each individual soul, to watch carefully over its implicit advance from truth to truth; and moreover, that He exercises this office the more solicitously, in proportion as the truth is of more vital importance to sanctification and salvation. Unbelievers often sneer at the Catholic's prayers, that this or that person may be led to the Faith or to more orthodox views of doctrine. "Surely," they say, "truth is discovered by argument; and it will be much more to the purpose if you argue with him than if you pray for him." We reply, that moral and religious truth is indubitably obtained by reasoning, but to a very small extent by argument; and in order to solid and effective reasoning, it is necessary that the relevant premisses be duly suggested and efficaciously impressed on the mind. What more suitable office than this to that Living Creator, who is the God of Truth? And what will move him more powerfully to still wider and more gracious interpositions, than that sound so dear to His ears, the voice of prayer?

2. Another frequent gibe of unbelievers is founded on the fact, that the great mass of Catholics are so strictly forbidden to read atheistical books. "The Church," say these critics, "virtually confesses that Theism cannot bear the light of reason; for if reason were on the side of Theism, to reason Theists would eagerly appeal.” There would undoubtedly be great force in this objection, if Catholics alleged that believers are commonly led to Theism by argument. And in the case indeed of philosophical controversialists, it is very important that they study atheistical works. But as to the great mass of men, who are led to religious truth indeed by reasoning but who cannot argue,-how can you act more absurdly, than by calling on them to examine both sides? to read treatises? to study adverse arguments? They have no arguments on their own side; how can they do justice to arguments on the other? Take the various illustrations of implicit reasoning which we gave a few pages back, and the self-evident truth of our statement will be abundantly manifest.

To make our point clearer to all our readers, let us fix our thoughts on one case in particular: the case in which a large family of sons are firmly convinced,-and that on the most irreVOL. XIII.—NO, xxvi. [New Series.]

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