either in their objects or their principle. If the concept is formed [merely] by [mutual] comparison of what falls under sense, it can contain nothing not perceptible to the sense; and consequently it can express nothing else than the generalization of phenomena. .. According to Locke then, the understanding would not differ from the sensitive faculty except in name. It would simply be the same faculty of knowledge, which is called the sensitive faculty when it perceives the particular, but is called the understanding when by comparison it searches for and discovers the universal. But if, on the contrary, it is certain that the understanding not only perceives phenomena but penetrates the intimate essence of things, it must first think that essence in the individual.

...

Such was the reasoning adopted against Locke . . . but men ought to have perceived . . . that the abstraction of the scholastics is totally distinct from that of the modern empirists. (Phil. Scol., n. 69.)

In fact the Lockian doctrine of abstraction is simply a philosophical portent to be denounced. On the other hand, to set forth and defend the scholastic doctrine* on that subject,-to descant on species sensibiles and intelligibiles, on sensus intimus and phantasy, would require an entire article. At present therefore, we can do no more than cite various passages from Suarez and from F. Kleutgen, which will exhibit, with a clearness almost startling to many, the broad opposition between the two views. The italics throughout are our own.

...

A species [intelligibilis] is not said to be abstracted from phantasms as though the species were first mixed up with phantasms and separated from them by the intellectus agens . . . for it would be puerile to suppose this. . . . That the intellect abstracts a species, means nothing else, than that it forms by its own power a spiritual species, representing the same nature which the phantasm represents, but after a spiritual fashion. And it is this elevation from material to spiritual representation, which is called abstraction. (Suarez de Animâ, 1. 4, c. 2, n. 18.)

The intellect, from cognition of the accidents, proceeds to contemplate those things which . . . lie hid under the accidents; and thence indeed is called intellectus, quasi intus legens. (Ib., c. 4, n. 1.)

...

The intellect often contemplates (intelligit) things, of which the phantasy possesses no resemblances. (Ib., c. 7, n. 1.)

Since the intellect is immaterial, it is in no respect subject to the materiality of its object; but overcomes it and (as far as possible) spiritualizes it. (Ib., c. 3, n. 20.)

*We think it cannot fairly be denied, that S. Thomas's expressions are occasionally ambiguous and liable to be interpreted in a Lockian sense. But very far less can it be denied, that his doctrine, as a whole, is correctly represented by F. Kleutgen in the passages which follow. Such is apparently, on both particulars, the Carlovian's view see p. 191 of his August article.

As we perceive phenomena in the object by our senses, because these correspond to the nature of our senses; so we know by our reason that which is exclusively within the sphere of that faculty. (Kleutgen, Phil. Scol., n. 63.) Should we be able, at the sight of an individual action, to conceive a maxim of morality, unless we previously possessed [in some sense] certain notions relative to the moral order? Assuredly no. (Ib.)

The scholastics say, when they explain abstraction, that as in a [given] object the eye seizes the colour, the ear the sound, &c. &c., so in the same object the intellect perceives what it is its province to cognize: viz. the nature and the essence. (n. 69.)

It is one thing to think nothing but the phenomena, and to regard that which is common to them as being the essence of things: it is [quite] another thing to perceive the essence through [the veil of] the phenomena. (n. 70.) The reason ... no doubt primitively. . . resembles a tabula rasa : but it is the reason itself, and not the sensitive faculty, which writes on that "tabula." (n. 72.)

Since it is the same soul, which knows respectively by the senses and the reason, the presence of the sensible representation suffices, in order that the reason should be excited to exercise its activity, and to direct that activity on the object which the senses perceive. According to Suarez, the sensible representation can have no other influence than this on the origin of intellectual representations. (n. 74.)

If, instead of dwelling on certain inexact expressions [incautiously adopted by certain modern scholastics], men would study the clear and precise expressions which were unanimously taught by the most celebrated doctors of the school, they would be obliged to admit that, according to the scholastics, the intellectual act which forms concepts is essentially different from [that which forms] sensible representations or images. It is because the mind is independent of matter in its being as in its operations, that (according to the scholastics) the intellect. . . is capable of those highest representations which they call the principia prima, &c. . . . And because the intellect can perceive, by these highest representations, all which is presented to it, it is also capable of separating essence from accidents, and penetrating through phenomena to being itself. (n. 97.)

By the knowledge of causation we quit the region of things sensible and enter into the supersensible. Now,who could maintain that scholasticism did not recognize this truth? The scholastics unanimously taught that the existence and nature of the supersensible are known by means of things sensible: its existence, because we ought to think it as principle and cause of the sensible; its nature, because we ought to think it as possessing all those qualities without which it could not be such cause. (n. 100.)

Thought from the first moment at once goes beyond phenomena. (Ib.) The scholastics taught unanimously, that the intellectual representation is not impressed on the mind by the phantasy; but engendered by the intellect as such, that is as distinct from the senses. (n. 109.)

According to the scholastics, the sensible representation does not excite the intellect to think, except in this sense, that it places before the mind an object which is capable of being known intellectually. Moreover . . . the presence VOL. XIII.—NO. XXVI. [New Series.]

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[of this sensible representation] could not have any effect on the intellect, were it not that it is the same mind which cognizes both by senses and by intellect. (Ib.)

Now let it be considered, how widely F. Kleutgen has been accepted by adherents of the scholastic philosophy, as quite a representative exponent of that philosophy. Canon Walker, for example, than whom it possesses no more enthusiastic devotee, calls him "the illustrious Kleutgen" ("First Principles," p. 37, note); and implies unreserved agreement with him. Although therefore we have no space in our present article to set forth and defend the scholastic doctrine of abstraction, surely, after such testimonies as the above, we are entitled to assume what will abundantly refute the objection before us. The objection alleges it to be the scholastic doctrine, that man's intellect cannot directly apprehend supersensible ideas; that man possesses no further intellectual power, than that of combining and generalizing phenomena. But we affirm confidently-though as yet we must be content to rest the matter on Kleutgen's testimony-that such a representation is a total perversion of scholasticism; that, according to that philosophy, man possesses the power of thinking various thoughts, which are neither directly nor indirectly derived from (though they may be first occasioned by) sensation and experience. All which has to be said on the other side, is merely that scholastic philosophers admit, what the strongest à priori philosophers of this day admit also. See our July number, p. 158. The scholastics, we say, admit, that the intellect is unable in this life to exercise its intrinsic power, except under a certain dependence (of which we need not here determine the precise extent) on the previous and concomitant operation of the senses.

Our argument then (so far) may be thus summed up. We think the word "psychologism" may be very suitably used to express that tenet, which teaches that the intellect can cognize no objects external to its own affections and operations. And our thesis has been, that there is a fundamental and violent antagonism, between this tenet and the scholastic philosophy. We have argued for this thesis positively, by referring to that scholastic doctrine of intellectual light, which is a point blank denial of psychologism. We have argued for the same thesis negatively, by considering the two principal particulars, which have been alleged as instances of an affinity between the two philosophies. It has been alleged, (1) that scholasticism represents axioms as mere generalizations from experience; and (2) that it denies to the intellect all power of directly apprehending supersensible ideas: but we have maintained confidently that its doctrines are the very reverse of these. We cannot but look on our point as one of very considerable importance. For considering the Church's repeated approbation of

scholasticism, it would indeed be a most serious fact, if that philosophy disparaged ever so remotely man's cognition of objective necessary truth.

We have just referred to the fact, that F. Kleutgen is so widely accepted as a most fair representative of the scholastic philosophy. We would entreat our readers then to ponder the following passage, written indeed by S. Augustine who lived before the scholastic period, but heartily and unreservedly accepted by Kleutgen in his great philosophical work:

The

It is in this that we see the superiority of that mind which thinks, over that being [the brute] which perceives exclusively by its senses. [rational] mind judges the sensible world, and in some sort commands it. If then there exists a being to which the [rational] mind itself is in turn subject --and if one can establish that this power, [thus] superior to the mind, must be eternal, immutable, and infinite,-the Existence of God will at once be demonstrated. What then is that thing which reigns as superior over all [rational] minds? It is the eternal and immutable truth, which contains in itself all that is immutably true. It is placed in authority over our mind; which judges not the truth, but judges [all things] according to the truth. For all our judgments, on external things and on ourselves, are formed according to those truths which we know to be eternal and immutable; and of which we seek no proof external to ourselves. And this truth must be placed in authority over our mind: inasmuch as the latter obtains its perfection by approaching it; obtains its beatitude by appropriating it; and becomes truly free by submitting to its empire. This truth exists indeed in every reasonable being, by his knowledge of it; but it belongs exclusively to no one. It is in some sort a common good like the sun, which all eyes contemplate, and in whose light they see all that they see. If then some Being, superior to this truth, governs the entire world of minds, it is He Who is God: if nothing is superior to this truth, then this truth itself is God. (Phil. Scol., n. 249.)

:

It is not then S. Augustine's doctrine only but F. Kleutgen's also, that man knows certain "eternal immutable truths," of which "he seeks no proof external to himself": truths which are the common heritage of mankind: truths which in so strong a sense reign over man's intellect, that, if there were no Being above them, their aggregate might in some sense be called God. F. Kleutgen indeed holds, with S. Augustine, that in fact God is superior to (and therefore not identical with) these various truths. Still, as he expressly endorses the expression that they are "eternal and immutable," he can mean nothing else than what he himself says in so many other places: viz., that they are founded on God's Essence, and exist necessarily because God necessarily exists. See our July number, pp. 154-5. Of a writer who so speaks, the very last thing which can be said is, that he disparages the existence or legitimate claims of eternal, immutable, and necessary truth.

We now come to the second part of our argument: which, though certainly very far less momentous than the first, is by no means without a certain importance of its own. Whatever sense should be affixed to the word "psychologism "-at all events we must maintain confidently, that any Catholic places himself in a thoroughly false position, who appropriates to himself the word "ontologist." Both Dr. Meynell and the Carlovian call every man an ontologist, who upholds consistently the existence of necessary truth but in that sense, Liberatore, Dmowski, and all wellinstructed Catholics without exception (so far as intention goes at least), would be ontologists. As to Kleutgen himself, instead of being an enemy to ontologism, he would be simply one of the most pronounced ontologists in the whole world. We must allege however, that the true historical sense of the word is very different; and that this conclusion has been unanswerably demonstrated by F. Kleutgen, in the work which we have named first at the head of our article. For ourselves of course, we can only place before our readers a very small part of F. Kleutgen's matter; yet we hope we can say enough to give a sufficient specimen of his general argument. We contend then, that the term "ontologists" is properly applied only to those, who hold doctrines more or less closely resembling the seven condemned propositions; doctrines therefore, which no Catholic has any business to hold at all. We quoted at length the seven propositions in January, 1868 (p. 231, note). Here we will translate the first and third.

1. "The immediate knowledge of God, at least habitual, is essential to the human intellect; so that without it [the intellect] can know nothing, inasmuch as [this knowledge] is the intellectual light itself."

3.Universals considered objectively (à parte rei) are not really distinguished from God."

Now for the name "ontologism." It never existed before the beginning of this century; when it was invented by certain zealous Catholics, chiefly French, as denoting a certain philosophical system, which they zealously maintained, and which they were very desirous of substituting for the traditional views which had (more or less) possession of the schools. Among the most prominent and accredited advocates of this system, have been Fabre, Brancherau, Hugonin, and Ubaghs. Fabre, one of the earliest, thus explains his own doctrine. The italics are ours:

Ontologism is a system in which, after having proved the objective reality of general ideas, it is established that those ideas are no forms or modifications of our mind; that they are nothing created; that they are necessary,

* Tongiorgi mentions that it was Gioberti, who actually invented the name "ontologism."