Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market
One of the more troubling aspects of the ferment in macroeconomics that followed the demise of the Keynesian dominance in the late 1960s has been the inability of many of the new ideas to account for unemployment remains unexplained because equilibrium in most economic models occurs with supply equal to demand: if this equality holds in the labor market, there is no involuntary unemployment. Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market explores the reasons why there are labor market equilibria with employers preferring to pay wages in excess of the market-clearing wage and thereby explains involuntary unemployment. This volume brings together a number of the important articles on efficiency wage theory. The collection is preceded by a strong, integrative introduction, written by the editors, in which the hypothesis is set out and the variations, as described in subsequent chapters, are discussed.
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The Theory of Underemployment in Densely Populated Backward Areas
Another Possible Source of Stickiness
Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device
Involuntary Unemployment as a PrincipalAgent Equilibrium
Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment
Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages
Hierarchy Ability and Income Distribution
Incentives Productivity and Labor Contracts
Work Incentives Hierarchy and Internal Labor Markets
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